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The Public Health Implications 
of Religious Exemptions: A 
Balance Between Public Safety 
and Personal Choice, or Religion 
Gone Too Far? 
Christopher Ogolla† 
The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to 
expose the community or the child to communicable disease or 
the latter to ill health or death.1 
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Introduction 
Religion has historically influenced public health.2 It has, and does 
continue to play, both a positive and a negative role in population 
health. On the positive side, the evidence suggests that religion, 
however assessed, is generally a protective factor for mental illness.3 
In behavioral health, vegetarian diets required by many Hindu, 
Seventh Day Adventists, and Buddhist religions, among others, “have 
been found to be associated with decreased risk of heart disease.”4 
Additionally, in religions where smoking and drinking are prohibited 
(such as among the Mormons of Utah), “epidemiological maps of the 
incidence of lung cancer and liver disease show markedly low rates of 
occurrence.”5 
In many parts of the world, religious organizations and groups 
provide key public health functions including, but not limited to, 
provision of good nutrition, HIV treatment and counseling services, 
clean drinking water, childhood immunizations, and prenatal and 
neonatal health screening services. Here in the United States, faith-
based organizations have always been very active in the public health 
arena. Indeed, the Department of Health and Human Services has 
established a Center for Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships 
whose goal is to “lead the department’s efforts to build and support 
partnerships with faith-based and community organizations in order 
to better serve individuals, families and communities in need.”6 These 
positives do not conflict with any laws. 
On the other hand, religion has had some significant negative 
influences on public health. For example, many religious groups’ 
opposition to the use of condoms in the developing world has been 
 
2. Peter H. Van Ness, Religion and Public Health, 38 J. RELIGION & 
HEALTH 15, 17 (1999). 
3. Jeff Levin, Religion and Mental Health: Theory and Research, INT’L J. 
APPL. PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDIES 1, 10 (2010). 
4. Van Ness, supra note 2, at 17. 
5. Id. 
6. The Center for Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, U.S. DEP’T. 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/partnerships (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2014). 
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associated with the increased spread of HIV and AIDS.7 Other 
denominations like Christian Scientists and Jehovah’s Witnesses 
restrict members’ use of medical services.8 Between 2000 and 2002, 
New York City public health officials reported that a total of eleven 
newborn males had laboratory-confirmed herpes simplex virus (HSV) 
infections in the weeks following out-of-hospital Jewish ritual 
circumcision. Ten of the eleven newborns were hospitalized and two 
died.9  
Thus, it can be argued that to a great extent, religion and public 
health activities are inextricably intertwined. However, the 
constitutional relationship between the two is inordinately complex. 
Several constitutional rights are relevant to public health practice. 
Most common are the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.”10 In the words of Justice 
Hugo Black: 
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government 
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one 
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. 
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain 
away from church against his will or force him to profess a 
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for 
church attendance or non-attendance.11 
The first clause, or the Establishment Clause, “prohibits 
government actions that unduly favor one religion over another.  It 
 
7. Burundi: Religious Leaders’ Resistance to Condom Hurts HIV Fight, 
IRINNEWS.ORG (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/92817/Burundi-religious-leaders-
resistance-to-condoms-hurts-hiv-fight. 
8. Van Ness, supra note 2, at 18. 
9. Susan Blank et al., Neonatal Herpes Simplex Virus Infection Following 
Jewish Ritual Circumcisions that Included Direct Orogenital Suction – 
New York City, 2000–2011, 61 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 
405 (2012). 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
11. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). 
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also prohibits the government from unduly preferring religion over 
non-religion, or non-religion over religion.”12 
There are concerns in public health that “[e]xemptions—religious 
or otherwise—are dangerous and put individuals at risk for 
contracting potentially debilitating and deadly infectious diseases.”13 
The availability of religious exemptions in public health has pitted 
public health practitioners against those opposed to public health 
mandates such as those in immunization, contraception, quarantine, 
and isolation. For example, those against religious exemptions in 
public health contend that the First Amendment neither requires that 
states provide a religious exemption from immunization nor does it 
require that states provide religious accommodations with respect to 
immunization statutes.14 Additionally, they argue that “statutory 
religious exemption improperly advances religion because its essential 
effect is to entitle those holding a religious belief against 
immunization to be exempted from immunization.”15 Alternatively, 
“application of the religious exemption requires excessive 
entanglement of state and church.”16 Essentially, these arguments boil 
down to the fact that the religious exemptions themselves violate the 
Establishment Clause. Another line of criticism decries the strong 
privileges the law grants to religion by observing that “[t]here has 
been an ongoing religious dialectic between religious entities, the law 
and the public good for centuries, and it has tended from strong 
privileges for religious entities towards the application of the rule of 
law to them.”17 In other words, religion seems to be singled out for 
special beneficial treatment.18 
 
12. Establishment Clause, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/establishment_clause (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2014). 
13. EVERY CHILD BY TWO, RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FACT SHEET, 
http://www.vaccinateyourbaby.org/pdfs/religion_exemptions_fact_she
et.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). 
14. Turner v. Liverpool Cent. Sch., 186 F. Supp. 2d 187, 190 (N.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
15. Id. at 192. 
16. Id. at 191. 
17. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 238 (2005). 
18. Professor Steven Smith, a supporter of religious accommodations writes 
that “the anti-accommodationist position increasingly finds favor with 
legal academics. Why should religion be singled out for special 
constitutional treatment? Or at least for special favorable treatment . . . 
.” Steven D. Smith & Caroline Marla Corbin, Debate, The 
Contraception Mandate and Religious Freedom, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 
266 (2013). 
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Proponents of religious exemptions in public health contend that 
“any state inquiry into the nature or sincerity of a proclaimed 
religious belief is not driven by a compelling state interest and is 
therefore a blatant violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.”19 Others argue that the constitutional right to 
contraceptives, recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Griswold v. 
Connecticut20 is a negative liberty, not a positive right.21 They 
maintain that the “right created in Griswold was not a positive right 
to demand that the government provide or pay for contraceptives, 
much less than a right to force healthcare providers to prescribe or 
employers to subsidize contraception.”22 By induction, this argument 
holds that since the contraception right is a not a positive right, it 
cannot be mandated and therefore those opposed to it on religious 
grounds should be exempted. Still, others point to the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), “which explicitly commands 
affirmative accommodation of religion . . . .”23 RFRA, in turn, came 
about after the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon. v. Smith. 
In Employment Division v. Smith,24 the Court held that the Free 
Exercise Clause permitted Oregon to include religiously inspired 
peyote use within the reach of its general criminal prohibition on use 
of that drug, and therefore permitted the state to deny unemployment 
benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such 
religiously inspired use.25 In an oft-quoted phrase regarding the 
constitutionality of religious exemptions in public or state activities 
(read public health activities), the Court found, “[w]e have never held 
that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with 
an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to 
regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our 
 
19. Hepatitis B Vaccinations and State Law, RUTHERFORD INST. 4 (2002), 
http://www.vaclib.org/letters/B18-RE_1.PDF. The Rutherford 
Institute is a Charlottesville, VA, based group that provides legal 
services in the defense of religious and civil liberties; see David Hudson, 
The Establishment Clause Is Still a Contentious Battle Among the 
Justices, ABA J., Nov. 2013, at 16.  
20. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
21. Maureen Bailey, Contraceptive Insurance Mandates and Catholic 
Charities v. Superior Court of Sacramento: Towards a New 
Understanding of Women’s Health, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y., 368, 371 
(2005). 
22. Id. 
23. Smith & Corbin, supra note 18, at 266. 
24. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
25. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
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free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.”26 As noted 
by the Congressional Research Service, “[t]he Court’s decision lowered 
the constitutional baseline of protection, meaning that laws that do 
not specifically target religion are not subject to heightened review 
under the First Amendment.”27 
In response to Smith, Congress passed RFRA in 1993.28 RFRA 
provides in pertinent part: 
[The g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of 
general applicability, except only . . . if [the government] 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the 
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.29  
RFRA “essentially reinstated the heightened standard of 
protection applied to government actions that interfered with the free 
exercise of religion.”30  However, because of Smith, courts have 
generally held that there is no First Amendment free exercise right to 
religious exemptions from mandatory public health activities. Yet, 
despite this consensus among the courts, forty-eight states statutorily 
provide for religious exemptions for school vaccination laws,31 while 
twenty-one states offer exemptions from contraceptive coverage 
 
26. Id. at 878. 
27. CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43329, FREE EXERCISE 
OF RELIGION BY SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR OWNERS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA) 2 (2014), 
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43329.pdf. 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. Congress responded to Smith by enacting the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 
Stat. 1488 (November 16, 1993), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb “to 
restore the compelling interest test for free-exercise cases that prevailed 
prior to Smith and to provide a claim or defense to persons whose 
religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.” Autocam 
Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1 (1993). 
30. BROUGHER, supra note 27. 
31. See NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, STATES WITH RELIGIOUS AND 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXEMPTIONS FROM SCHOOL IMMUNIZATION 
REQUIREMENTS (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-
state-laws.aspx. 
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(usually for religious reasons) for insurers or employers in their 
policies.32 
The questions then arise; first, do religious exemptions in public 
health activities allow the government to unduly prefer religion over 
non-religion?33 Second, is immunizing religious conduct consistent 
with public welfare, health, and safety?34 Third, are the overwhelming 
number of states that provide statutory religious exemptions for 
immunizations (forty-eight) and religious exemptions for 
contraception (approximately half) tipping the balance heavily in 
favor of religion? Put otherwise, are these jurisdictions running on 
Scylla, wishing to avoid Charybdis?35 
This paper attempts to answer these questions by analyzing the 
historical, legal, and policy arguments for and against religious 
exemptions in public health functions, specifically in vaccination, 
contraception, and quarantine and isolation. This article notes that, 
although a number of states and localities have statutes, rules, and 
regulations mandating immunizations and provision of contraception, 
a majority of states have enacted religious refusal clauses essentially 
weakening the overall public health goals of the mandates. Part I 
reviews the positive and negative roles that religion plays in public 
health and argues that exemptions—religious or otherwise—are 
dangerous and put individuals at risk for contracting potentially 
debilitating and deadly infectious diseases.  
Part II describes the history of religious exemptions in public 
health noting that (1) they have been around since the early part of 
the nineteenth century; (2) that the exemptions are generally offered 
for medical, religious, and philosophical grounds; and (3) that there 
 
32. NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR 
CONTRACEPTION LAWS (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-coverage-for-
contraception-state-laws.aspx. 
33. See KENT GREENWALT, 1 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE 
EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS, 2 (2006) (“[T]he crucial issue then becomes 
whether legislatures or courts should create privileged exceptions that 
are based directly on a person’s religious convictions or rest on some 
standard, such as “conscience” that includes religious convictions but 
does not distinguish between them and similar nonreligious 
convictions.”). 
34. HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 8. 
35. Scylla and Charybdis are two monsters in Greek mythology. Scylla attacked 
sailors and Charybdis was a dangerous whirlpool at the mouth of the 
cave of the sea monster Scylla. To be stuck in between Scylla 
and Charybdis forces States between two equally unpleasant options: 
Granting religious exemptions hurts public health activities, but denying 
those exemptions may trigger free exercise and establishment clause 
challenges. Either way, the States are interfering with religion. 
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has been strong opposition to both vaccination and contraception. 
Nevertheless, great strides have been made in the provision of 
contraceptives despite several states having religious exclusions for 
their contraceptive equity laws.  
Part III discusses contraceptive equity laws in both state and 
federal courts and analyzes several cases challenging contraceptive 
mandates—in particular, Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. et al. v. Sebelius,36 
and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. HHS37—and their disparate 
impacts on public health. Part IV discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc.,38 and notes that its 
holding—that for-profit religious corporations can be considered 
persons exercising religion for purposes of the RFRA—does not bode 
well for public health. For example, this article argues in this section 
that the majority’s view that the government can simply 
accommodate for-profit corporations’ religious beliefs by paying for 
the contraceptives is unworkable, as argued by Justice Ginsburg in 
her dissent.  
Part IV discusses isolation and quarantine, noting that a 
significant problem with religious exemptions in quarantine and 
isolation is that they seem antithetical to science.  
Part V addresses the question of whether religious accommodation 
is a balance between public safety and personal choice, or religion 
gone too far. It avers that overwhelming number of states providing 
statutory religious exemptions for immunizations, and those that 
provide religious exemptions for contraception, quarantine, and 
isolation are tipping the balance heavily in favor of religion.  
Part VI offers some recommendations, specifically three 
individuals, who though not necessarily addressing religious 
exemptions, have done more to advance the goals of public health, 
individual rights, and personal autonomy notwithstanding. The paper 
concludes by arguing that religious exemptions in public health 
activities allow the government to unduly prefer religion over non-
religion, that immunizing religious conduct is not consistent with 
public welfare, health, and safety and, finally, that the overwhelming 
number of states (forty-eight) providing statutory religious 
exemptions for immunizations and the nearly half that provide 
exemptions for contraception, are tipping the balance heavily in favor 
of religion. 
 
36. 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013). 
37. 724 F.3d 377 (3rd Cir. 2013), rev’d by Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
38. 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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I. History of Religious Exemptions in Public Health 
Activities 
A. Vaccinations 
Religious exemptions have been around since the early part of the 
nineteenth century. In public health, exemptions are generally offered 
for medical, religious, or philosophical reasons.39 A religious exemption 
is a statutory provision that allows parents to exempt their children 
from vaccination if vaccination contradicts their sincere religious 
beliefs.40 It can also mean exemption from any public health activity 
based on one’s religious beliefs. A medical exemption exempts a child 
who is susceptible to adverse effects from the vaccine.41 Exemptions 
based on philosophical beliefs refer to the statutory language that 
does not restrict the exemption to purely religious or spiritual 
beliefs,42 but allows objections based on personal, moral, or other 
beliefs.43 
Most public health exemptions have been in the area of 
immunization. State immunization laws have a history dating back to 
the middle of the nineteenth century.44 Local municipalities, counties, 
cities, and boards of education were among the first to attempt to 
enact school vaccination laws and policies. Boston became the first 
U.S. city to require all public school children to show proof of 
vaccination in 1827.45 Next came the states. Within thirty years, 
Massachusetts would become the first state to enact a vaccination 
requirement for school children in order to prevent the transmission of 
smallpox.46 New York soon followed in 1862. Other states that passed 
similar laws included Connecticut in 1872, Indiana in in 1881, 
 
39. Daniel A. Salmon et al., Health Consequences of Religious and 
Philosophical Exemptions from Immunization Laws: Individual and 
Societal Risk of Measles, 282 JAMA 47 (1999). 
40. James G. Hodge & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination 
Requirements: Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L. J. 
831, 873 (2002). 
41. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER, 379 (Lawrence O. Gostin 
ed., 2002). 
42. Hodge & Gostin, supra note 40. 
43. See NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 31. 
44. Jean M. Santoli & Alan Hinman, Nonmedical Exemptions to State 
Immunization Laws, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 8 (2002). 
45. Hodge & Gostin, supra note 40, at 851. 
46. Kevin M. Malone & Alan Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The Public 
Health Imperative and Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH 
PRACTICE 262, 269 (Richard A. Goodman et al., eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
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Arkansas, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Virginia in 1882, California in 1888, 
Iowa in 1889, and Pennsylvania in 1895.47  
Although vaccinations were being used increasingly in schools, 
opposition to vaccination laws also arose in many quarters.48 Indeed, 
“[s]ome opponents expressed valid scientific objections about 
effectiveness; some worried that vaccination transmitted other 
diseases . . . or caused harmful effects; and others objected on grounds 
of religious or philosophical principles.”49 In the seminal public health 
case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts,50 Reverend Henning Jacobson 
refused the vaccination, citing concerns over the vaccination’s safety 
and claiming that he and his son had previously experienced adverse 
reactions to vaccinations.51 In rejecting Jacobson’s contention and 
upholding the Massachusetts statute, the Supreme Court noted that: 
The authority of the state to enact this statute is to be referred 
to what is commonly called the police power,—a power which 
the state did not surrender when becoming a member of the 
Union under the Constitution. Although this court has refrained 
from any attempt to define the limits of that power, yet it has 
distinctly recognized the authority of a state to enact 
quarantine laws and ‘health laws of every description;’ indeed, 
all laws that relate to matters completely within its territory 
and which do not by their necessary operation affect the people 
 
47. Hodge & Gostin, supra note 40, at 851. 
48. See, e.g., The Coll. of Physicians of Phila., History of the Anti 
Vaccination Movements, HIST. OF VACCINES, 
http://historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/history-anti-vaccination-
movements (last updated Dec. 18, 2014) (referring to the British 
Vaccination Acts of 1853 and 1867 and noting that “[t]he Vaccination 
Act of 1853 ordered mandatory vaccination for infants up to 3 months 
old, and the Act of 1867 extended this age requirement to 14 years, 
adding penalties for vaccine refusal. The laws were met with immediate 
resistance from citizens who demanded the right to control their bodies 
and those of their children.”); Allison M. Kennedy et al., Vaccine Beliefs 
of Parents Who Oppose Compulsory Vaccination, 120 PUB. HEALTH 
REP. 252, 257 (2005) (noting that “[o]pposition to compulsory 
vaccination is not a new phenomenon; it has been present in some form 
since the earliest compulsory vaccination laws.”); Zucht v. King, 260 
U.S. 174, 175 (1922) (deciding the case of Rosalyn Zucht, a child 
excluded from the San Antonio Texas public school because she did not 
have the required certificate of vaccination and refused to submit to 
vaccination). 
49. Hodge & Gostin, supra note 40, at 844. 
50. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
51. Ben Horowitz, A Shot in the Arm: What a Modern Approach to 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts Means for Mandatory Vaccinations During a 
Public Health Emergency, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1716, 1719 (2011). 
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of other states. According to settled principles, the police power 
of a state must be held to embrace; at least, such reasonable 
regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will 
protect the public health and the public safety.52 
Thus the court dismissed Jacobson’s exemption argument on the 
basis that a “health regulation requiring small pox vaccination was a 
reasonable exercise of the state’s police power that did not violate the 
liberty rights of individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution.”53 Although in Jacobson, “the question was 
whether the state had overstepped its own authority and whether the 
sphere of personal liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment included the right to refuse vaccination,”54 
others have noted that Jacobson’s brief was “riddled with religious 
rhetoric.”55 
Hundreds of cases have followed Jacobson’s reasoning.56 For 
example, in Wright v. Dewitt School District No.1 of Arkansas 
County, 57 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a state health 
regulation which required all students to be vaccinated against 
smallpox as prerequisite to attending school was a reasonable 
regulation and a reasonable exercise of police power and as such did 
not violate the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.58 In 
that case, the appellants—adults and school age children—were 
members of a church known as the General Assembly and Church of 
the First Born.59 The appellee, DeWitt School District #1 of Arkansas 
County, required all students to be vaccinated against smallpox as a 
prerequisite to attending school pursuant to a state health regulation. 
The appellants argued that this requirement violated their religious 
beliefs. They also contended that the school age appellants had been 
attending the schools operated by the Dewitt School District #1 for 
 
52. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24-25. 
53. Malone & Hinman, supra note 46, at 271. 
54. Wendy K. Mariner, et al., Jacobson v. Massachusetts: It’s Not Your 
Great-Great Grandfather’s Public Health Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
581, 582 (2005). 
55. See Horowitz, supra note 51, at 1719 n.29 (citing Mariner, supra note 
54, at 582 and noting that “while the brief filed by Jacobson was riddled 
with religious rhetoric, the Court only addressed the health concern 
advanced by Jacobson.”). 
56. Using Westlaw’s KeyCite citing references, 3,038 citations for the case 
were shown as of August 2014. 
57. Wright v. De Witt Sch. Dist., 385 S.W.2d 644 (Ark.1965). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 645. 
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many years without being vaccinated, and as a result no one had 
suffered any adverse effect; that there had been no smallpox in 
Arkansas County for more than fifty years; and that no immediate, 
grave, or present danger existed which justified any infringement 
upon their constitutional right to freely exercise their religious views.60 
In dismissing their appeal, the Court noted that the appellants did 
not have the legal right to resist on religious grounds the enforcement 
of the health regulation requiring the vaccination of all children as a 
prerequisite to attendance of the schools operated by the School 
District.61 
Here, the Court relied on the language from Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts62 for the principle that “the police power of a state 
must be held to embrace; at least, such reasonable regulations 
established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public 
health and the public safety.”63 
1. Recent Religious Exemption Challenges 
Courts have consistently upheld immunization laws that mandate 
vaccinations even when challenged on religious belief grounds.64 For 
example, in Brown v. Stone,65 the Mississippi Supreme Court struck 
down as unconstitutional a part of a statute that provided an 
exemption to vaccination on religious grounds. The statute provided, 
in relevant part that “[a] certificate of religious exemption may be 
offered on behalf of a child by an officer of a church of a recognized 
denomination. This certificate shall certify that parents or guardians 
of the child are bona fide members of a recognized denomination 
whose religious teachings require reliance on prayer or spiritual means 
 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
63. Wright, 385 S.W.2d at 647. 
64. See Daniel Salmon & Andrew Siegel, Religious and Philosophical 
Exemptions from Vaccination Requirements and Lessons Learned from 
Conscientious Objectors from Conscription, 116 PUB. HEALTH REP. 289 
(2001) (noting that “[t]he jurisprudence the U.S. Supreme Court has 
developed in cases in which religious beliefs conflict with public or state 
interests suggests that mandatory immunization against dangerous 
diseases does not violate the First Amendment right to free exercise of 
religion . . . .”); Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218, 221 (Miss. 1979) (noting 
that “[t]he courts have weighed the interest of the state in protecting its 
citizenry as against the desirability of religious freedom devoid of 
unnecessary governmental intrusion and have generally concluded that 
the state interest was paramount.”). 
65. Brown, 378 So.2d at 223. 
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of healing.”66 In Brown, a father filed a suit seeking an injunction to 
compel a school district to admit his son as a student even though his 
son had not complied with the statute requiring immunization of all 
students.67 The father argued that he did not permit his son to be 
vaccinated because of strong and sincere religious beliefs, and that he 
sought a religious exemption from vaccination for his son but was 
denied because the certificate did not comply with the statute.68 
Consequently, he contended that the religious exemption provisions of 
the statute were invalid insofar as they forced complainants to join a 
religious organization in order to practice their religious beliefs 
freely.69 
The Mississippi Court agreed with the father. In striking down 
the exemption, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that 
[t]he exception, which would provide for the exemption of 
children of parents whose religious beliefs conflict with the 
immunization requirements, would discriminate against the 
great majority of children whose parents have no such religious 
convictions. To give it effect would result in a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
which provides that no state shall make any law denying to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, in 
that it would require the great body of school children to be 
vaccinated and at the same time expose them to the hazard of 
associating in school with children exempted under the religious 
exemption who had not been immunized as required by the 
statute.70 
Critics might contend that Brown v. Stone is an example of a case 
that overrides individual autonomy in favor of the police powers of 
the state. For example, the Brown Court relies on Prince v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,71 Jacobson v. Massachusetts,72 and 
Zucht v. King,73 for the principle that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
long held that it is within the police power of the state to provide for 
compulsory vaccination. This is only partially true. The U.S. Supreme 
 
66. Id. at 219. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 221. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 223. 
71. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
72. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
73. 260 U.S. at 176. 
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Court cases did not specifically hold that exemption from 
immunizations violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause. Indeed, in Jacobson, Justice Harlan noted that the 
courts may strike down legislation designed to protect the general 
welfare when it has no real or substantial relation to the public 
health, morals, or safety, or if the legislation is “a plain, palpable 
invasion of rights” secured by the constitution.74 In his view, “the 
police power of a state, whether exercised directly by the legislature, 
or by local body acting under its authority, may be exerted in such 
circumstances, or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in 
particular cases, as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent 
wrong and oppression.”75 
However, there is a long line of cases, dating from 1830 to 2001 
where courts have held that vaccination laws do not discriminate 
against school children to the exclusion of others in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.76 In that sense, the Brown court was right in 
striking the religious exemption. 
A different line of religious exemption cases inquires whether the 
challenger’s beliefs are religious and whether they are sincere. One 
such case is Mason v. General Brown Central School District.77 In 
that case, parents who advocated “a natural existence”78 challenged a 
district court’s ruling dismissing their complaint which sought to 
compel the school district to permit their son, based on his own 
religious beliefs, and his parents’ beliefs, to attend public school 
without being immunized as required by New York law.79 The law 
required that all children be immunized before starting school but 
provided an exemption to those who opposed immunization on 
religious grounds.80 The plaintiffs belonged to a church group that had 
no membership requirements, no worship or other services, and no 
traditional doctrine.81 The district court found that as regards the 
 
74. 197 U.S. at 31. 
75. Id. at 38. 
76. See PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER, supra note 41, at 387. 
77. Mason v. Gen. Brown Cent. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1988). 
78. Id. at 49 (finding that “the [Plaintiffs] believe that the human body 
possesses the means of healing itself without medical intervention and 
that therefore, immunizations are unnecessary and indeed contrary to 
the ‘genetic blueprint’ intended by nature.”). 
79. Id. at 48. 
80. Id. at 49. 
81. Id. 
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plaintiffs’ beliefs, “they were not essentially religious but were a mere 
embodiment of chiropractic ethics.”82 
In affirming the district court’s decision, the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit analyzed whether the appellants’ beliefs were 
religious. It agreed with the district court that the appellants’ beliefs 
were not religious. The appellate court then analyzed whether the 
organization to which the appellants belonged, possessed an indicia of 
a religious group or order.83 In a telling analysis of the group, the 
court stated: 
The [group] has no rites of membership, no requirement of 
active participation, no regular religious meetings, no system of 
providing guidance to its members, no regular contact between 
members and leaders, and no indication that it provides any 
religious services, i.e., marriages, burials, or community and 
humanitarian aid . . . . Significantly, anyone with the money 
can ‘buy’ into the church and obtain any desired ecclesiastical 
title (including bishop, priest, archbishop, friar, reverend, or 
rabbi) by doing no more than filling out an application and then 
writing out a check.84 
Thus the religious exemption claim in Mason failed because the 
courts deemed their beliefs primarily scientific in nature, non-religious 
based, and that the group with which they were affiliated was not a 
bona fide religious order.  
A contrary outcome occurred in Turner v. Liverpool Central 
School.85 In Turner, the plaintiff contended that the school district 
violated her constitutional rights and those of her minor daughter by 
failing to provide a religious exemption from the state’s immunization 
requirement.86 Before registering her daughter for kindergarten, the 
plaintiff notified the school district that she was religiously opposed to 
the introduction of any foreign material into the human body and, 
therefore, sought a religious exemption from New York State’s 
immunization requirement. The plaintiff believed in universal life 
force.87 After questioning the plaintiff, the district determined that the 
 
82. Id. at 50. 
83. Id. at 53. 
84. Id. 
85. 186 F. Supp. 2d at 187. 
86. Id. at 187. 
87. The court noted that “Plaintiff believes in a Universal Life Force, which 
is the manifestation of God in all things . . . . According to Plaintiff, 
immunization interferes with the transmission of the life force and 
disrupts one’s natural balance and, therefore, one’s ability to receive the 
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congregation was not a genuine religion and that although the 
plaintiff’s beliefs regarding immunization were sincere, they were 
founded upon a personal philosophy rather than a legitimate 
religion.88 In denying the district’s motion for dismissal, the court 
found that the religious views that the plaintiff espoused appeared to 
be religious in nature as opposed to merely philosophical or 
scientific.89 In that case, the court found for the plaintiff noting that 
the secular purpose of the exemption is to allow children whose 
parents have a “genuine and sincere religious belief” that prohibits 
them from having their children inoculated, to attend school.90  
Why the disparate result between the plaintiff in Mason v. 
General Brown Central School District advocating a natural existence 
and the plaintiff in Turner v. Liverpool Central School District 
belonging to universal life force that saw immunization as interfering 
with the transmission of the life force and therefore disrupting one’s 
natural balance? Is there sincerity in the latter and none in the 
former? Perhaps the distinction rests on the fraudulent nature of the 
church group in Mason. There, the court noted that “[w]hile it has 
sometimes been difficult for us to establish precise standards by which 
the bona fides of a religion may be judged, these difficulties have not 
hindered us in denying protected status to organizations which are 
‘obviously shams and absurdities’ and whose leaders ‘are patently 
devoid of religious sincerity . . . .’ The [Universal Life Church] and 
more specifically for purposes of this case, the [Davenport Universal 
Life Church] is such an organization.”91  
The problem with the sincerity analysis is three-fold. First, it is a 
probing interference in religion, historically considered 
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court.92 Second, at the 
administrative level, it allows the school district to determine what 
religious belief is and what it is not. This can be a slippery slope. 
Third, because sincerity of beliefs is a fact specific endeavor, courts 
risks being bogged down by collateral issues by putting the plaintiff 
through a trial of his asserted beliefs, including, arguably, unorthodox 
ones. However, the flip side of the argument against the sincerity 
analysis is that “[w]hile courts must avoid determining the validity of 
religious beliefs, at times it may be necessary to determine whether 
 
life force . . . . In addition, Plaintiff believes that immunization violates 
the sanctity of the body.” Id. at 189 n.2. 
88. Id. at 189.  
89. Id. at 189-90. 
90. Id. at 192. 
91. Mason v. Gen. Brown Cent. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1988) 
92. BROUGHER, supra note 27, at 3. 
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beliefs would qualify as religious for certain purposes, including 
religious exemptions for statutory requirements.”93  
2. Implications for Public Health Practice 
Although “[i]n practice, legal exemptions for vaccination 
constitute only a small percentage of total school entrants[,] . . . 
disease outbreaks in religious communities that have not been 
vaccinated do occur” as shown by epidemiological evidence.94 Among 
the most cited epidemiological studies include a study that reported 
outbreaks of measles that occurred in two groups of Christian 
Scientists in 1985. Thomas Novotny noted that “[t]hese outbreaks 
resulted in 187 cases . . . [accounting] for 6.7 percent of 2,813 total 
cases reported to CDC in 1985.”95 The authors attributed the 
outbreak to state immunization laws that exempt religious groups.96  
Another study quantified the risk of contracting measles among 
individuals who claimed religious or philosophical exemptions from 
immunization (exemptors) and compared the result with vaccinated 
persons. The study also examined the risk that exemptors pose to the 
nonexempt population. The study found that “[o]n average, 
exemptors were [thirty-five] times more likely to contract measles 
than were vaccinated persons.”97 Additionally, an increase or decrease 
in the number of exemptors would affect the incidence of measles in 
non-exempt populations. As Daniel Salmon found, “[i]f the number of 
exemptors doubled, the incidence of measles infection in nonexempt 
individuals would increase by 5.5 percent, 18.6 percent, and 30.8 
percent, respectively, for intergroup mixing ratios of 20 percent, 40 
percent, and 60 percent.”98 Similar findings were obtained by Daniel 
Feikin and colleagues who “conducted a population-based 
 
93. Id. 
94. According to CDC’s report on vaccination coverage among children in 
kindergarten for the 2012-2013 school year, “an estimated 91,453 
exemptions were reported among a total estimated population of 
4,242,558 kindergarteners. Overall, among the 49 states and DC that 
reported 2012–13 school vaccination exemptions, the percentage of 
kindergarteners with an exemption ranged from 0.1% in Mississippi to 
6.5% in Oregon, with a median of 1.8%.” Ctrs. for Disease Control & 
Prevention, Vaccination Coverage Among Children in Kindergarten – 
United States, 2012–13 School Year, 62 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WEEKLY REP. 607, 607-609 (2013); PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A 
READER, supra note 41. 
95. Thomas Novotny et al., Measles Outbreaks in Religious Groups Exempt 
from Immunization Laws, 103 PUB. HEALTH REP. 49, 50 (1988). 
96. Id. at 52. 
97. Salmon et al., supra note 39. 
98. Id. 
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retrospective cohort study using data collected on standardized forms 
regarding all reported measles and pertussis cases among children 
aged three to eighteen years in Colorado during 1987-1998.”99 They 
found that those who had religious or personal exemptions from 
vaccinations were on average twenty-two times more likely to acquire 
measles and six times more likely to acquire pertussis than vaccinated 
children.100 They further found that “[i]n children of day care and 
primary school age, in whom contact rates and susceptibility are 
higher, these risks were approximately 62-fold and 16-fold greater 
among exemptors for measles and pertussis, respectively.”101 In 2000, 
the CDC reported that “the two most recent outbreaks of polio 
reported in the United States affected members of religious groups 
who object to vaccination (i.e., outbreaks occurred in 1972 among 
Christian Scientists and in 1979 among members of an Amish 
community).”102 Between September 2004 and February 2005, the 
CDC further reported that there were 345 cases of pertussis affecting 
primarily preschool aged children among the Amish in Kent County, 
Delaware. The report noted that vaccine-preventable disease 
outbreaks continue to occur among under-vaccinated populations in 
the United States, including contained religious communities.103 
Jessica Atwell has noted that “[a]s recent as 2010, 9,120 cases of 
pertussis were reported in California, more than any year since 
1947.”104 Atwell similarly concluded that geographic areas with non-
medical exemptions are associated with high rate of pertussis.105 
Finally, in September 2013, the Texas Tribune reported that “[i]n 
Tarrant County, an unvaccinated man contracted measles abroad and 
spread the disease to twenty people at Eagle Mountain International 
 
99. Daniel Feikin, et al., Individual and Community Risks of Measles and 
Pertussis Associated with Personal Exemptions to Immunization, 284 
JAMA 3145, 3145 (2000). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 1349. 
102. D. Rebecca Prevots et al., Poliomyelitis Prevention in the United States: 
Updated Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices (ACIP), 49 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1, 9 
(2000). 
103. P. Eggers et al., Pertusis Outbreak in Amish Community – Kent County 
Delaware, September 2004 - February 2005, 55 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 817, 817 (2006). 
104. Jessica Atwell et al., Nonmedical Vaccine Exemptions and Pertussis in 
California, 2010, 132 PEDIATRICS 624, 624 (2013). 
105. Id. at 629. 
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Church who had not been vaccinated or had not received a second 
dose of the MMR vaccine, as recommended.”106  
These studies and reports tend to show that there is a link 
between religious exemption laws in vaccination and public health. 
The effects clearly place public health at risk. Consequently, personal 
and religious belief exemptions should be eliminated because they 
present a risk to the “herd immunity.”107 For example, in a globalized 
world, with frequent travel, transmission of vaccine-preventable 
diseases is much easier and more widespread; therefore, those who 
choose not to be vaccinated based on religious beliefs endanger the 
health of not only the members of their immediate communities, but 
many other people in places that are easily reachable by travel.108 
Measured against this standard, a strong argument can be made for 
doing away with religious exemptions in vaccination and in public 
health altogether. In spite of the evidence, surprisingly, states have 
expanded religious exemptions in other public health areas, notably in 
contraception and in quarantine and isolation. 
B. Contraception 
Contraception plays a significant role in women’s health and 
public health in general. It is vital to preventing unintended 
 
106. Becca Aaronson, Outbreaks Make a Case for Vaccination, TEX. 
TRIBUNE, Sept. 9, 2013, 
http://www.texastribune.org/2013/09/09/outbreaks-make-case-
vaccinations/.  
107. Herd immunity generally means that above a certain immunization 
percentage rate in a population, a disease cannot spread to enough 
people during its incubation period to sustain itself. Thus, the higher the 
immunization rate, the more immune the population would be to the 
disease. Professor Epstein points out that “[i]mportantly, the efficacy of 
a vaccine from a societal standpoint depends largely on how widespread 
the use of the vaccine is. A free-rider problem arises whenever someone 
decides not to take the vaccine, thinking that the targeted disease is 
near eradication because everyone else has taken the vaccine. Note that 
the public benefit of any vaccination program decreases as more people 
make this strategic choice.” Richard Epstein & Catherine Sharkey, 
Products Liability, CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS 794 (10th ed., 2012).  
108. For example, in 2014, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) reported that measles had infected 129 people in thirteen states, 
the most in the first four months of any year since 1996. Thirty-four of 
the cases were imported via travel to other countries, including 
seventeen from the Philippines where a huge outbreak had affected 
20,000 people and caused sixty-nine deaths. Lenny Bernstein, CDC 
Reports Biggest Measles Outbreak Since 1996, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-
health/wp/2014/04/24/cdc-reports-13-measles-outbreaks-in-the-u-s-
most-cases-since-1996/.  
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pregnancies, which account for half of all pregnancies among 
American women.109 According to a 2011 Institute of Medicine study, 
approximately 49 percent of pregnancies in the United States were 
unintended.110 Contraception reduces unintended pregnancies, 
abortions, and may prevent the spread of sexually transmitted 
infections, such as HIV/AIDS.111 The CDC lists family planning as 
one of the ten great public health achievements of the twentieth 
century.112 Additionally, the CDC notes that “the most important 
determinant of declining fertility in developing countries is 
contraceptive use, which explains 92 percent of the variation in 
fertility among fifty countries.”113  
While “various methods of contraception have been utilized since 
Roman times, contraceptive birth control information and 
contraceptive devices were once prohibited” by state and federal law 
in the United States.114 Contraceptives were considered obscene and 
immoral.115 The modern birth control movement began in 1912.116 In 
1916, Margaret Sanger, a public health nurse concerned about the 
adverse health effects of frequent childbirth, challenged the laws that 
suppressed the distribution of birth control information by opening 
the first family planning clinic in Brooklyn, New York.117 Sanger 
challenged the “Comstock Act . . . which prohibited the importation 
and transmittal through the mails of any contraceptive devices or any 
 
109. Barriers to Contraceptive Access for Low-Income Women, NAT’L INST. 
FOR REPROD. HEALTH 
http://www.nirhealth.org/sections/publications/documents/contraceptiv
eaccessquicksheetFINAL.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). 
110. INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING 
THE GAPS 79, 102 (2011). 
111. NAT’L INST. FOR REPROD. HEALTH, supra note 109. 
112. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public Health, 
1900–1999: Family Planning, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY 
REP. 1073, 1073 (1999). 
113. Id. at 1076. 
114. PETER N. SWISHER ET AL., FAMILY LAW: THEORY, PRACTICE AND FORMS 
§ 5:11 (9th ed. 2014). 
115. See Note, Judicial Regulation of Birth Control Under Obscenity Laws, 
50 YALE L. J. 682, 682 (1941) (noting that “[r]egulation of 
contraceptives began in 1873 . . . . By forbidding the mailing, 
importation, and interstate transportation of indecent articles, obscene 
publications and ‘contraceptives,’ Congress hoped to check the moral 
degeneration that followed the Civil War.”). 
116. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 112, at 1073. 
117. Id. 
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writings describing contraceptive devices.”118 Although Sanger was 
threatened with a forty-five year jail term for violating the Act, and 
was later jailed for a month,119 she continued to challenge the law. 
These challenges established a legal precedent that allowed physicians 
to provide advice on contraception for health reasons.120 During the 
1920s and 1930s, Sanger continued to promote family planning by 
opening more clinics.121 As a result, physicians gained the right to 
counsel patients and to prescribe contraceptive methods. By the 
1930s, a few state health departments and public hospitals had begun 
to provide family planning services.122 
In the 1960s, the contraceptive pill and the intrauterine device 
(IUD) were put on the American market, despite heated objections 
from various religious groups.123 Among those opposing the pill was 
the Roman Catholic Church, which had officially banned any 
“artificial” means of birth control in 1930.124 
In 1961, Dr. C. Lee Buxton, the chairman of the Yale Medical 
School department of obstetrics and gynecology, and Estelle Griswold, 
the executive director of Connecticut Planned Parenthood, opened 
four Planned Parenthood clinics. They were arrested for defying a 
Connecticut law that made it a crime to use birth control.125 Their 
prosecution led to the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Connecticut statute 
forbidding use of contraceptives violated the right of marital privacy 
that is within the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights.126 Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that a Massachusetts statute which prohibited the 
 
118. SWISHER ET AL., supra note 114, at § 5.11 n. 1. 
119. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 30A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 6359 (2014). 
120. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 112, at 1073. 
121. Id. at 1073-74. 
122. Id. at 1074. 
123. SWISHER, supra note 114. 
124. The American Experience, People & Events: The Catholic Church and 
Birth Control, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/peopleevents/e_church.html (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
125. The American Experience, Timeline: The Pill 1951-1990, at 3, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/timeline/timeline2.html (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
126. 381 U.S. 479, 485, 486 (1965). 
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distribution of contraceptives to unmarried adults was also 
unconstitutional.127  
America has since evolved from its early history of prohibiting 
contraception to present-day practices where a substantial number of 
states are affirmatively providing state-supported family planning 
information and services for the benefit of their citizens. In 1978, 
Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) which 
amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The PDA 
prohibited employment discrimination against a person because of 
pregnancy or because of child/pregnancy-related medical issues.128 In 
December 2000, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) ruled that exclusion of prescription contraceptives from a 
health insurance plan violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.129 
Since 1998, several state legislatures have passed contraceptive 
equity laws which require that “[g]enerally, if an insurer or plan 
covers other prescription drugs and/or outpatient services, it must 
also cover contraceptives and contraceptive services—and it must do 
so on comparable terms.”130 According to the Guttmacher Institute, 
“[twenty-eight] states [now] require insurers that cover prescription 
drugs to [also] provide coverage of the full range of FDA approved 
contraceptive drugs and devices.”131 Many of those states “do not 
allow religious hospitals to opt out. And nearly half do not allow 
religious universities to refuse, either.”132 Among the states that do 
not have religious refusal clauses include Colorado133, Georgia134, 
 
127. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
129. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N , Decision on Coverage of 
Contraception (Dec. 14, 2000) , available at 
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CONTRACEPTIVES (Feb. 1, 2015), available at 
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132. Star-Ledger Editorial Board, Birth Control: A Matter of Public Health, 
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133. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-104 (West 2014) on maternity coverage 
stating that “[a]ll group sickness and accident insurance policies 
providing coverage within the state . . . shall insure against the expense 
of normal pregnancy and childbirth or provide coverage for maternity 
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Iowa135, New Hampshire136, Vermont137, and Wisconsin.138 California, 
New York, and Oregon provide limited religious exclusions. For 
example, the California Insurance Code on disability, insurance, and 
contraceptive coverage provides that “a religious employer may 
request a disability insurance policy without coverage for 
contraceptive methods that are contrary to the religious employer’s 
 
care and provide coverage for contraception in the same manner as any 
other sickness, injury, disease . . . .” 
134. See GA. CODE § 33-24-59.6 (2014) on coverage for prescription drugs 
and devices for contraception stating in pertinent part that “[e]very 
health benefit policy that is delivered, issued, executed, or renewed in 
this state or approved for issuance or renewal in this state by the 
Commissioner on or after July 1, 1999, which provides coverage for 
prescription drugs on an outpatient basis shall provide coverage for any 
prescribed drug or device approved by the United States Food and Drug 
Administration for use as a contraceptive.” 
135. See IOWA CODE § 514C.19 (2014) (prohibiting various health insurance 
plans that provide benefits for outpatient prescription drugs, devices or 
services from denying or restricting benefits for FDA-approved 
prescription contraceptive drugs, devices or outpatient services). 
136. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415:18-I (2014) (requiring, among other 
things that “[e]ach insurer that issues or renews any group policy of 
accident or health insurance providing benefits for medical or hospital 
expenses, which provides coverage for outpatient services shall provide 
to each group, or to the portion of each group comprised of certificate 
holders of such insurance who are residents of this state, coverage for 
outpatient contraceptive services under the same terms and conditions 
as for other outpatient services.”). 
137. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4099c (2014) (stating that “[a] health 
insurance plan shall provide coverage for outpatient contraceptive 
services including sterilizations, and shall provide coverage for the 
purchase of all prescription contraceptives and prescription 
contraceptive devices approved by the federal Food and Drug 
Administration.” Additionally, “[a] health insurance plan . . . shall not 
establish any rate, term or condition that places a greater financial 
burden on an insured or beneficiary for access to contraceptive services, 
prescription contraceptives and prescription contraceptive devices than 
for access to treatment, prescriptions or devices for any other health 
condition.”). 
138. WIS. STAT. § 609.805 and § 632.895(17) (2014) (requiring that, on 
coverage of contraceptives, insurance policies and self-insured health 
plans that provide coverage for outpatient health care services, 
preventive services or prescription drugs and devices also provide 
coverage for contraceptives prescribed by a health care provider). The 
law also requires that any outpatient services that are necessary to 
prescribe, administer, maintain or remove a contraceptive be provided if 
such services are covered for any other drug benefits. See also NAT’L 
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 32. 
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religious tenets.”139 Similarly, the Health and Safety Code on religious 
employer exemption provides, in pertinent part, that “a religious 
employer may request a health care service plan contract without 
coverage for federal Food and Drug Administration approved 
contraceptive methods that are contrary to the religious employer’s 
religious tenets. If so requested, a health care service plan contract 
shall be provided without coverage for contraceptive methods.”140 
Despite several states having religious exclusions for their 
contraceptive equity laws, great strides have been made in provision 
of contraceptives since the early 1900s. This has indeed been good for 
public health. The Georgia statute, for example, notes that 
maternal and infant health are greatly improved when women 
have access to contraceptive supplies to prevent unintended 
pregnancies, that the absence of prescription contraceptive 
coverage is largely responsible for the fact that women spend 68 
percent more in out-of-pocket expenses for health care than 
men; and requiring insurance coverage for prescription drugs 
and devices for contraception is in the public interest in 
improving the health of mothers, children, and families and in 
providing for health insurance coverage which is fairer and more 
equitable.141 
Nevertheless, in spite of these great strides in availability and 
access to contraceptives, the debate between access to and use of 
contraceptives vis-à-vis one’s religious convictions still rages on, both 
in state courts and increasingly in federal courts.142 The U.S. Supreme 
Court, in Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores Inc.,143 shed some light on 
this issue, though it still left some questions unanswered.144 In order to 
help the reader understand the legal battles leading to the Hobby 
Lobby decision, this article now provides a brief account of the state 
and federal cases where plaintiffs challenged contraception laws. 
 
139. CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196 (West 2014).  
140. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (West 2014). 
141. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.6 (West 2014). 
142. This increase is attributable to the passage of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2713, 124 Stat. 
119, 131 (2010), which required certain preventive health services and 
screenings to be covered in all new health insurance, plans without cost 
sharing. 
143. 134 S.Ct. at 2751. 
144. For example, because Hobby Lobby challenged forms of contraception 
that prevent uterine implantation, but did not object to those that 
prevent conception, it is unclear what will happen to cases where 
plaintiffs are challenging all the contraceptives. 
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II. CONTRACEPTIVE EQUITY LAWS AND RELIGIOUS 
REFUSAL CLAUSES145 
A. State Precedents 
In Catholic Charities v. Superior Court of Sacramento, Catholic 
Charities, a social service organization, challenged the provisions of 
the Women’s Contraception Equity Act (WCEA)146 requiring those 
employers that provided group health care and disability insurance 
prescription coverage for their employees to include coverage for 
prescription contraceptives.147 The WCEA provides an exemption that 
“permits a religious employer to request a policy that includes drug 
coverage but excludes coverage for contraceptive methods that are 
contrary to the religious employer’s religious tenets.”148 The law 
describes a “religious employer” as “an entity for which each of the 
following is true:”  
(A) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the 
entity.  
(B) The entity primarily employs persons who share the 
religious tenets of the entity.  
(C) The entity serves primarily persons who share the religious 
tenets of the entity.  
(D) The entity is a nonprofit organization as described 
in Section 6033(a)(2)(A) i or iii, of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986, as amended.149 
The charity “challenged the exemption as involving an 
impermissible distinction between religious and secular activities of a 
religious institution.”150 Additionally, it argued that the law violates 
the Free Exercise Clauses of the U.S. and California Constitutions by 
coercing the organization to violate its religious beliefs, in that the 
law, by regulating the content of insurance policies, in effect requires 
 
145. As of the time of writing this article, there are several court cases that 
have made their way through state supreme courts and in the federal 
circuits challenging laws that require religious organization charities to 
cover birth control for their employees. 
146. 32 Cal.4th 527, 85 P.3d 67 (Ca. 2004); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
1367.25(a) (West 2000). 
147. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 73. 
148. Id. at 74. 
149. § 1367.25(b)(1). 
150. Bailey, supra note 21, at 376. 
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employers who offer their workers’ insurance for prescription drugs to 
offer coverage for prescription contraceptives.151 In upholding the 
exemption against this challenge, the California Supreme Court first 
noted that Catholic Charities did not qualify as a “religious employer” 
under the Women’s Contraception Equity Act because it did not meet 
any of the definition’s four criteria.152 The court further noted that 
Catholic Charities did not primarily employ persons who share its 
Roman Catholic religious beliefs, but rather employed a diverse group 
of persons of many religious backgrounds, all of whom shared its 
Gospel-based commitment to promote a just, compassionate society 
that supports the dignity of individuals and families.153 Additionally, 
the court found that “Catholic Charities [served] people of all faith 
backgrounds, a significant majority of [whom] did not share [its] 
Roman Catholic faith . . . . Consequently, . . . [it was] not entitled to 
an exemption from the mandate imposed by the [law].”154 
Second, regarding the violation of the Free Exercise Clause, the 
court, citing Employment Division. v. Smith, stated that the U.S. 
Supreme Court “articulated the general rule that religious beliefs do 
not excuse compliance with otherwise valid laws regulating matters 
the state is free to regulate . . . . [T]he right of free exercise does not 
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and 
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes).’”155 
One commentator has argued that the California Supreme Court 
interpreted the “religious employer” distinction wrongly, stating: 
The question is once the legislature has decided to grant an 
exemption to a religious employer, may it further define 
‘religious employer’ in such a radical way that some employers 
that one would ordinarily think of as religious (Catholic 
Charities) do not qualify because the legislature has deemed 
them ‘secular’ . . . ? Catholic Charities argued that the parsing 
of the religious organization into secular components was 
problematic but the court failed to address the argument 
altogether.156 
 
151. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 81. 
152. Id. at 75. 
153. Id. at 77. 
154. Id. at 75. 
155. Id. at 81. 
156. Bailey, supra note 21, at 377. 
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The California Supreme Court correctly upheld the Act’s narrow 
religious exemption. First the court rightly noted that the law’s 
requirements apply neutrally and generally to all employers, 
regardless of religious affiliation, except to those few who satisfy the 
statute’s strict requirements for exemption on religious grounds.157 
Catholic Charities did not. Second, in terms of public health, the 
court makes the following compelling argument: 
The Legislature enacted the WCEA in 1999 to eliminate gender 
discrimination in health care benefits and to improve access to 
prescription contraceptives. Evidence before the Legislature 
showed that women during their reproductive years spent as 
much as 68 percent more than men in out-of-pocket health care 
costs, due in large part to the cost of prescription contraceptives 
and the various costs of unintended pregnancies, including 
health risks, premature deliveries and increased neonatal care. 
Evidence also showed that, while most health maintenance 
organizations (HMO’s) covered prescription contraceptives, not 
all preferred provider organization (PPO) and indemnity plans 
did. As a result, approximately 10 percent of commercially 
insured Californians did not have coverage for prescription 
contraceptives.158 
The above statement offers a justification as to why the California 
legislature passed the law as a way of eliminating gender 
discrimination. In essence, “a failure to provide contraceptive coverage 
when a plan does include prescriptive drug benefits amounts to sex 
discrimination.”159 
A similar constitutional challenge was mounted in New York, in 
Catholic Charities of Albany v. Serio.160 In that case, Catholic 
Charities challenged the validity of legislation requiring health 
insurance policies that provide coverage for prescription drugs to 
include coverage for contraception.161 The court found that the 
“Women’s Health and Wellness Act (WHWA) [mandated] expanded 
health insurance coverage for a variety of services needed by women, 
including mammography, cervical cytology, and bone density 
screening.”162 The WHWA contained provisions requiring that an 
employer health insurance contract “which provides coverage for 
 
157. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 82. 
158. Id. at 74. 
159. Bailey, supra note 21, at 380. 
160. 859 N.E.2d 459 (2006). 
161. Id. at 461. 
162. Id. 
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prescription drugs shall include coverage for the cost of contraceptive 
drugs or devices.”163 Catholic Charities argued that the provisions 
“[violated] their rights under the religion clauses of the federal and 
state constitutions.”164 They objected to the contraceptive coverage 
mandated in the WHWA.165 
Just like in Catholic Charities v. Superior Court of Sacramento, 
discussed above, the New York court found as a threshold matter that 
none of the plaintiffs qualified as a “religious employer” under the 
WHWA,166 because the “plaintiffs are not, or are not only, churches 
ministering to the faithful, but are providers of social and educational 
services.”167 Additionally, most of the plaintiffs acknowledged that 
they employ many people not of their faith, and that they serve 
people not only of their faith.168 
Turning to the Free Exercise Clause argument, the New York 
court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that WHWA burdened their 
First Amendment rights and instead held that the Act is a generally 
applicable and neutral statute. The court found that “[t]he fact that 
some religious organizations—in general, churches and religious orders 
that limit their activities to inculcating religious values in people of 
their own faith—are exempt from the WHWA’s provisions on 
contraception does not, as plaintiffs claim, demonstrate that these 
provisions are not ‘neutral.’”169 More important to this discussion is 
the New York court’s reliance on public health grounds to explain the 
passage of the law. The court observed: 
The Legislature debated the scope of the ‘religious employer’ 
exemption intensely before the WHWA was passed. A broader 
exemption was proposed, one that would have been available to 
any ‘group or entity . . . supervised or controlled by or in 
connection with a religious organization or denominational 
group or entity’ . . . . Supporters of this version of the 
exemption argued, as do plaintiffs here, that religious 
organizations should not be forced to violate the commands of 
their faith. Those favoring a narrower exemption asserted that 
the broader one would deprive tens of thousands of women 
 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 463. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 464. 
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employed by church-affiliated organizations of contraceptive 
coverage. Their view prevailed.170 
Most significantly, both the California and the New York courts 
emphasized the public health importance of the narrow religious 
exemptions. Whereas the plaintiffs in both cases would have liked for 
the courts to not have distinguished between “religious employers” 
and “secular activities of religious organizations,”171 the courts read 
the statutes narrowly, thereby ensuring that tens of thousands of 
women employed by church-affiliated organizations would receive 
contraceptive coverage. This is a victory for public health for two 
principal reasons: First, both the legislatures and respective supreme 
courts acknowledged the importance of contraceptives to public 
health. Second, the rulings are a victory because many public health 
practitioners see these religious exemptions as aiding or advancing 
religion.172 For public health practitioners, a public health law that 
does not provide for a religious exemption, such as the one in 
Mississippi, or a narrower religious exemption, such as the ones in 
New York and California, are preferable to the broader exemptions 
advocated by the plaintiffs in these cases. Of course, public health 
practitioners recognize that these are two competing trends. Putting 
aside constitutional arguments, a no-religious exemption trend is 
better than the other because elimination of the religious exemptions 
will reduce the danger of putting individuals at risk for contracting 
diseases. 
In sum, whereas state courts have consistently upheld laws 
mandating vaccination and contraception against religious exemption 
and constitutional challenges, in the federal courts, the results have 
been mixed.  
B. Federal Precedents 
The distinction between federal and state precedents is that 
federal court precedents have involved challenges from both religious 
entities and for-profit corporations.173 These challenges have been 
 
170. Id. at 462. 
171. See Catholic Charities v. Superior Court of Sacramento, 85 P.3d 67, 79 
(Ca. 2004). 
172. Turner v. Liverpool Cent. Sch., 186 F. Supp. 2d 187, 191 (N.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
173. According to a report by the National Women’s Law Center, “90 
lawsuits have been filed in federal courts challenging the Affordable 
Care Act’s no cost-sharing provisions . . . [forty-five] of the cases have 
been filed by for profit companies ranging from a crafts store chain to 
an HVAC company.” NAT’L. WOMEN’S LAW CTR., OVERVIEW OF THE 
LAWSUITS CHALLENGING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S NO COST-
 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
The Public Health Implications of Religious Exemptions: A Balance 
Between Public Safety and Personal Choice, or Religion Gone Too Far? 
286 
premised on the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).174 The 
challenges have been fueled largely by the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA). 
1. The Affordable Care Act and the Contraception Mandate 
Congress passed the ACA in 2010.175 The centerpiece of the ACA 
was its focus on preventive services in health. During the legislative 
process, an amendment to the ACA (known as the Women’s Health 
Amendment) required coverage for recommended preventive services 
for women without cost sharing.176 The “U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) charged the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
with reviewing what preventive services are important to women’s 
health and well-being and then recommending which of these should 
be considered in the development of comprehensive guidelines.”177 The 
IOM made several recommendations regarding women’s reproductive 
health including, but not limited to, “a [full] range of contraceptive 
education, counseling, methods, and services so that women can 
better avoid unwanted pregnancies and space their pregnancies to 
promote optimal birth outcomes.”178 HHS adopted these 
recommendations as part of the ACA guidelines. In response to the 
request for comments on the interim final regulations, “most 
commenters, including some religious organizations, recommended 
that the [Department’s] guidelines include contraceptive services for 
all women and that this requirement be binding on all group health 
plans and health insurance issuers with no religious exemption.”179 
 
SHARING CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE BENEFIT 1 (Nov. 2013), available 
at 
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/contraceptive_coverage_litigati
on_overview_11-11-13_v2_vf.pdf. 
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).  
175. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, § 2713, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
176. David Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Senate Passes Women’s Health 
Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009, available at 
http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/senate-passes-
womens-health-amendment/?_r=0. 
177. INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING 
THE GAPS: REPORT BRIEF, 1 (2011) 
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Clinical-
Preventive-Services-for-Women-Closing-the-
Gaps/preventiveservicesforwomenreportbrief_updated2.pdf/. 
178. Id. at 2. 
179. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage 
of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable 
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Others asserted that “requiring group health plans sponsored by 
religious employers to cover contraceptive services that their faith 
deems contrary to its religious tenets would impinge upon their 
religious freedom.”180 HHS amended its rules to provide for religious 
exemption where contraceptive services are involved.181 For purposes 
of the exemption, a religious employer is one that: “(1) has the 
inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily employs 
persons who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serves persons 
who share its religious tenets; and (4) is a non-profit organization 
under section 6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the 
Code.”182 The religious employer exemption was modeled after the 
method of religious accommodation used in several states that already 
required health insurance issuers to provide coverage for 
contraception.183 
Plaintiffs have since brought several actions in federal courts 
challenging the lawfulness of the preventive services coverage 
regulations.184 Two cases, Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. et al. v. Sebelius185 
and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. HHS,186 are germane to this 
article.187 In the former, appellants, two for-profit corporations—
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Mardel, Inc.—and the corporations’ 
owners, challenged the district court’s denial of their motion for 
preliminary injunction, contending that the requirement that Hobby 
Lobby’s group health plan cover all forms of FDA-approved contra-
ceptives violates RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause, and the 
Administrative Procedure Act.188 Hobby Lobby et al., emphasized  
Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 
45 C.F.R. § 147). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. (“Sections 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) and (iii) [of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 as amended], refer to churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and 
conventions or associations of churches, as well as to the exclusively 
religious activities of any religious order.”). 
183. Id. 
184. For a list of cases then challenging the Contraceptive Mandate, see 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the United States HHS, 
724 F.3d 377, 396 n. 10 (3d Cir. 2013) (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
185. 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013). 
186. 724 F.3d 377. 
187. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently upheld Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. 
et al., v. Sebelius, and reversed Conestoga Wood Specialities v. HHS 
(now Conestoga Wood Specialties v. Burwell). See Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). 
188. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1125. 
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that they objected to forms of contraception that prevent uterine 
implantation, but did not object to those that prevent conception.189 
The questions for consideration at the court of appeals were as 
follows: “(1) whether Hobby Lobby and Mardel are ‘persons’ 
exercising religion for purposes of RFRA; (2) if so, whether the 
corporations’ religious exercise is substantially burdened; and (3) if 
there is a substantial burden, whether the government can 
demonstrate a narrowly tailored compelling government interest.”190 
The court answered the first two questions in the affirmative noting 
that individuals may incorporate for religious purposes and keep their 
free exercise rights, and unincorporated individuals may pursue profit 
while keeping their free exercise rights.191 In addressing the 
contraceptive mandate, the court found that the contraceptive-
coverage requirement was invalid as applied to Hobby Lobby because 
that requirement is not “the least restrictive means of advancing a 
compelling interest.”192 
2. Implications for Public Health Practice 
From a public health standpoint, there are several problems with 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in Hobby Lobby. First, 
the decision encroaches on the doctor-patient relationship. In other 
words, certain decisions, such as which contraception to use or which 
medicine or form of treatment an employee should pursue should be 
left for the employee and his or her doctor.193 As Judge Rovner noted 
in the dissent in Grote v. Sebelius: 
Any given medical decision, depending on the nature of the 
patient’s condition, the available treatments, and the 
circumstances confronted by doctor and patient, might be 
inconsistent with the religious beliefs of one or more owners of 
the company that sponsors the patient’s workplace insurance. 
Holding that a company shareholder’s religious beliefs and 
practices are implicated by the autonomous health care 
decisions of company employees, such that the obligation to 
insure those decisions, when objected to by a shareholder, 
represents a substantial burden on that shareholder’s religious 
 
189. Id. at 1126. Essentially, Hobby Lobby objected to drugs and devices 
with known post-fertilization mechanism of action, i.e., those drugs and 
devices that could cause abortions. 
190. Id. at 1126. 
191. Id. at 1143. 
192. Id. at 1143-44. 
193. Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 858 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., 
dissenting).  
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liberties, strikes me as an unusually expansive understanding of 
what acts in the commercial sphere meaningfully interfere with 
an individual’s religious beliefs and practices.194  
One can therefore argue that “[a]llowing religious doctrine to 
prevail over the need for competent [medical] care and a woman’s 
right to complete and accurate information about her condition and 
treatment choices violates [not only] medical ethics [but also] existing 
law.”195 To this point, one commentator has noted that “[f]or almost a 
half-century, the Supreme Court has held that people have the 
fundamental right to control their reproductive autonomy, which 
includes the right to purchase and use contraceptives. The 
government has a compelling interest in helping to facilitate the 
ability of people, and especially women, to exercise this basic right of 
reproductive autonomy.” 196 
Second, allowing employers to refuse to cover certain services, 
based on their (employers) personal religious beliefs will likely create 
major structural and logistical problems in the U.S. healthcare 
system, where the employer sponsored healthcare plans play a 
significant role.197 “The system of employer-sponsored health insurance 
has long provided coverage to the vast majority of America’s workers 
and their dependents.”198 Indeed, “in the first half of 2003, the U.S. 
employer-based health insurance market provided insurance to over 
159 million Americans who constitute nearly two-thirds (63.4 percent) 
of the population under 65.”199 Generally, the employer pays the 
insurance premium subsidy to the health insurer, which in turn pays 
for the medical costs of the employee. In this instance, the insurance 
company decides what to pay and what not to pay for. Should 
insurance companies decline, for example, to pay for certain 
contraceptives based on the employers’ religious beliefs? And since 
 
194. Id. at 866. 
195. Editorial, When Bishops Direct Medical Care, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/opinion/when-bishops-
direct-medical-care.html?_r=0.  
196. Erwin Chemerinsky, God, Birth Control and Corporate America: 
Claiming Religious Freedom to Avoid Providing Insurance for 
Contraceptives Runs Afoul of the Law, NAT’L., L. J., Dec. 9, 2013, at 38.  
197. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen et al., When Religious Freedom Clashes with 
Access to Care, 371 NEJM 596, 596-98 (2014) (noting that “Hobby 
Lobby’s outcome is of concern to U.S. health care professionals because 
our health insurance system is still largely dependent on employers.”). 
198. Mark Stanton, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Employer-
Sponsored Health Insurance Trends in Cost and Access, 17 AGENCY FOR 
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY: RES. IN ACTION 1, 2 (2004). 
199. Id. 
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insurance companies tend to have large pools of subscribers, how 
would they distinguish payments for those using contraceptives and 
those not using contraceptives? As some commentators have so aptly 
noted, “[e]mployers and employees may have fundamentally different 
perspectives on which medical interventions are acceptable, 
particularly when the employer’s fundamental mission is not to 
advance specific religious beliefs and its employees are therefore 
unlikely to be drawn exclusively from its own religious group.”200 
Third, the protection of women’s health is a compelling 
governmental interest. For example, in 2001, an IOM report found 
that 42 percent of unintended pregnancies in the United States ended 
in abortion.201 The report also found that “[t]he risk factors for 
unintended pregnancy are female gender and reproductive 
capacity.”202 Additionally, “[w]omen suffer disproportionate rates of 
chronic disease and disability from some conditions, and often have 
high out-of-pocket health care costs.”203 And “[e]ven though slightly 
over half of the U.S. population is female, apart from reproductive 
concerns, medical research historically has neglected the health needs 
of women.”204 The government has and often does address these needs 
through legislation such as the contraceptive mandate.  
Another compelling governmental interest is in reducing health 
disparities. Significant racial and ethnic disparities exist in women’s 
health. For example, non-Hispanic black and some Hispanic 
populations have preterm births at rates 60 percent and 27 percent 
higher, respectively, than the rate for non-Hispanic white women.205 In 
terms of teen pregnancy, teenagers who give birth are much more 
likely than older women to deliver a low birth weight or preterm 
infant, and their babies are at higher risk for dying in infancy. 
Additionally, the annual public costs associated with births among 
 
200. Cohen et al., supra note 197, at 598. 
201. See INST. OF MED, supra note 110, at 102. 
202. Id. at 103. 
203. Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps, NAT’L ACAD. 
PRESS http://www.nap.edu/catalog/13181/clinical-preventive-services-
for-women-closing-the-gaps (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
204. INST. OF MED., WOMEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH: PROGRESS, PITFALLS AND 
PROMISE 1 (2010). 
205. Committee Opinion Number 317: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in 
Women’s Health, 106 AM. CONG. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS 
889, 890 (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.acog.org/-
/media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-
Underserved-Women/co317.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20141026T1033161790.  
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teenage girls are an estimated $10.9 billion.206 Making contraceptives 
accessible to women thus serves the twin public health functions of 
addressing health disparities among women and preventing unwanted 
pregnancies. The editorial board of the New England Journal of 
Medicine underscored this point, writing: 
If the full panel of FDA-approved contraceptive services is made 
available to American women, the public health of the country 
will benefit. If a woman’s religious beliefs compel her to decline 
such services, she has the right to do so. But to deny coverage 
for these vital public health services to women who want them 
but cannot afford them outside their employer-sponsored 
insurance would be a personal and public health tragedy.207 
The court in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. HHS208 arrived 
at the opposite conclusion from the court in Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. 
et al. v. Sebelius. In Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., appellants 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation, a secular, for-profit 
corporation, and five of its shareholders, the Hahns, contended that 
providing the mandated coverage would violate their religious beliefs 
under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA.209 In rejecting the 
appellants contention, the court first noted, as a threshold matter, 
that a for-profit, secular corporation cannot engage in religious 
exercise.210 The court based its reasoning on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti that “certain 
guarantees are held by corporations and that certain guarantees are 
‘purely personal’ because ‘the historic function of the particular 
guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals.’”211 The 
Free Exercise Clause, noted the court of appeals, is one such 
guarantee.212 
The Conestoga decision squared with the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in 
Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, which also held that secular, profit-seeking 
corporate employers are not a person capable of “religious exercise” as 
 
206. Stephanie Ventura et al., Pregnancy and Childbirth Among Females 
Aged 10–19 Years – United States, 2007–2010, 62 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 71, 71 (2013). 
207. Editorial, Contraception at Risk, 370 NEJM 77, 78 (2013). 
208. 724 F.3d 377 (3d. Cir. 2013). 
209. Id. at 380. 
210. Id. at 388. 
211. Id. at 383 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
778 n. 14 (1978)). 
212. Id. at 388. 
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intended by RFRA.213 More recently, the same Sixth Circuit Court in 
Michigan Catholic Conference v. Burwell,214 held that that nonprofit 
entities affiliated with the Catholic Church that have religious 
objections to certain preventive care standards under the ACA failed 
to demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the merits of its claim 
that the ACA’s contraceptive-coverage requirement violated RFRA, 
the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Establishment Clause.215 
On the other hand, several federal circuit courts, including the 
District of Columbia and both the Seventh and Tenth Circuit Courts 
of Appeals, have held that for-profit corporations can be considered 
“persons” exercising religion for purposes of RFRA, and that the for-
profit corporations’ religious exercise is substantially burdened by the 
contraceptive mandate.216 This circuit split was finally resolved by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
III. The U.S. Supreme Court Brings the Curtain Down, 
“Let the Government Pay”: Implications for Public 
Health Practice 
In June 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court settled the circuit split 
above by affirming the judgment of the Tenth Circuit217 and reversing 
the judgment of the Third Circuit.218 In a 5-4 decision, the Court 
ruled in a consolidated opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores 
Inc.,219 that the contraception mandate is unlawful, noting that as 
applied to closely held corporations, the HHS’s regulations imposing 
the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA because it is not the least 
restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.220 
The Court first determined that Congress included corporations 
within RFRA’s definition of “persons.”221 Second, it found that for-
 
213. Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d at 626. 
214. Michigan Catholic Conference & Catholic Family Serv. v. Burwell, 755 
F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2014).  
215. Id. at 398.  
216. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2013); Grote v. 
Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 866 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
217. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., et al. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 
2013). 
218. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dept. of Health 
& Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013). 
219. 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2751 (2014). 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 2769. 
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profit corporations can exercise religion under RFRA.222 Third, the 
Court noted that the mandate placed a substantial burden on the 
corporation’s exercise of religion. The court assumed that the HHS 
had shown a compelling interest for the mandate, but failed the 
second prong of the test—that is, whether the contraceptive mandate 
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern-
mental interest. 223 
Notably, the Court seemed to endorse, and even encourage, the 
idea that the government could simply accommodate for-profit 
corporations’ religious beliefs by paying for the contraceptive. In his 
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy remarked: 
The parties who were the plaintiffs in the District Courts argue 
that the Government could pay for the methods that are found 
objectionable . . . . In discussing this alternative, the Court does 
not address whether the proper response to a legitimate claim 
for freedom in the health care arena is for the Government to 
create an additional program . . . . The Court properly does not 
resolve whether one freedom should be protected by creating 
incentives for additional government constraints. In these cases, 
it is the Court’s understanding that an accommodation may be 
made to the employers without imposition of a whole new 
program or burden on the Government. As the Court makes 
clear, this is not a case where it can be established that it is 
difficult to accommodate the government’s interest, and in fact 
the mechanism for doing so is already in place.224 
Here, the Court seemed to have been shifting the focus from 
contraceptive access for women to determining who should pay for 
contraceptives. Indeed, in the dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by 
Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor, termed the “let the 
government pay” solution as unworkable. Ginsburg poses the 
following questions: 
And where is the stopping point to the ‘let the government pay’ 
alternative? Suppose an employer’s sincerely held religious belief 
is offended by health coverage of vaccines, or paying the 
minimum wage . . . or according women equal pay for sub-
 
222. Id. at 2769-72. 
223. Id. at 2780 (“We will assume that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free 
access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is compelling within 
the meaning of RFRA, and we will proceed to consider the final prong 
of the RFRA test, i.e., whether HHS has shown that the contraceptive 
mandate is ‘the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
govern­mental interest.’”) (citation omitted). 
224. Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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stantially similar work . . . . Does it rank as a less restrictive 
alternative to require the government to provide the money or 
benefit to which the employer has a religion-based objection?225 
Whether the Court’s decision is pragmatic or unprincipled will be 
analyzed and debated for years to come. For the public health 
community, there are several points to ponder. 
First, although this case involved small, closely held corporations, 
the impact on public health policy carries national implications. For 
example, it is unclear how this ruling will affect the contraception 
needs of female employees of large publicly held corporations. Justice 
Ginsburg in her dissent notes that “[t]he Court’s determination that 
RFRA extends to for profit corporations is bound to have untoward 
effects. Although the Court attempts to cabin its language to closely 
held corporations, its logic extends to corporations of any size, public 
or private.”226 In responding to this argument initially raised by HHS, 
the Court glosses over this point by simply stating that, “[t]hese 
cases, however, do not involve publicly traded corporations, and it 
seems unlikely that the sort of corporate giants to which HHS refers 
will often assert RFRA claims. HHS has not pointed to any example 
of a publicly traded corporation asserting RFRA rights, and numerous 
practical restraints would likely prevent that from occurring”227  
However, just because corporate giants have not asserted RFRA 
claims against public health mandates, does not necessarily mean that 
they are unlikely to, or even will not assert the claims. As Chief 
Justice Roberts noted while upholding the ACA in 2012, “[l]egislative 
novelty is not necessarily fatal; there is a first time for everything.”228 
Second, and most important to public health, the Court went to 
great lengths to limit its ruling to the mandate while apparently 
shielding other public health activities from similar RFRA challenges. 
In perhaps one of the few safe harbors for public health, the Court 
notes: 
Our decision in these cases is concerned solely with the 
contraceptive mandate. Our decision should not be understood 
to hold that an insurance coverage mandate must necessarily 
fall if it conflicts with an employer’s religious beliefs. Other 
coverage requirements, such as immunizations, may be 
supported by different interests (for example, the need to 
combat the spread of infectious diseases) and may involve 
 
225. Id. at 2802 (Ginsburg J., dissenting). 
226. Id. at 2797 (Ginsburg J., dissenting). 
227. Id. at 2774. 
228. Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012). 
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different arguments about the least restrictive means of 
providing them.229 
But this may be of little comfort to the public health community. 
Some commentators have remarked that “in the wake of [Burwell] 
v. Hobby Lobby, we may anticipate challenges to other medical 
services that some religions find objectionable, such as vaccinations, 
infertility treatments, blood transfusions, certain psychiatric 
treatments, and even hospice care.”230 
Finally, public health practitioners will take comfort from the fact 
that the Court’s decision was purely a statutory interpretation and 
did not reach any First Amendment claims.231 But this comfort may 
be short lived since it is likely that the same reasoning can be 
extended to the First Amendment. 
The broader public policy implications of the Hobby Lobby 
decision on other areas of public health and healthcare in general, still 
remain to be seen. For example, although Justice Alito noted that the 
decision “[c]oncerns only the contraceptive mandate and should not be 
understood to hold that all insurance-coverage mandates, e.g., for 
vaccinations or blood transfusions, must necessarily fall if they 
conflict with an employer’s religious beliefs. Nor does it provide a 
shield for employers who might cloak illegal discrimination as a 
religious practice,”232 one may wonder if this means that vaccination 
programs are safe from RFRA challenges for now. Additionally, how 
many other employers would test and indeed implement the newly 
declared religious rights? Finally, would the newly declared religious 
rights have any impacts on the exemptions for isolation and 
quarantine? 
IV. Isolation and Quarantine: Implications for Public 
Health Practice 
Isolation refers to the separation of ill persons who have a 
communicable disease from those who are healthy,233 whereas 
 
229. Burwell, 134 S.Ct. at 2783. 
230. Cohen et al., supra note 297, at 598. 
231. See Burwell, 134 S.Ct. at 2785 (noting that “[t]he contraceptive 
mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, violates RFRA. Our 
decision on that statutory question makes it unnecessary to reach the 
First Amendment claim raised by Conestoga and the Hahns.”). 
232. Id. at 2758. 
233. Christopher Ogolla, Non-Criminal Habeas Corpus for Quarantine and 
Isolation Detainees: Serving the Private Right or Violating Public 
Policy?, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 135, 139 (2011). 
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quarantine “is used to separate and restrict the movement of well 
persons who may have been exposed to a communicable disease to see 
if they become ill.”234 Generally, the literature is bereft of cases where 
states have applied religious exemptions to quarantine and isolation.235 
This is largely due to the fact that “public health quarantine and 
isolation are legal authorities that may be, but rarely are, 
implemented to prevent the spread of communicable diseases.”236 
Nevertheless, some state statutes contain language that appears to 
grant religious exemptions. For example, a North Dakota statute 
provides in relevant part that “to the extent possible, cultural and 
religious beliefs must be considered in addressing the needs of 
individuals and establishing and maintaining isolation and quarantine 
premises.”237 Similarly, the Oregon Revised Statutes provide that 
“cultural and religious beliefs should be considered to the extent 
practicable in addressing the needs of persons who are isolated or 
quarantined and in establishing and maintaining premises used for 
isolation or quarantine,”238 and that “ [i]solation or quarantine shall 
not abridge the right of any person to rely exclusively on spiritual 
means to treat a communicable disease or possibly communicable 
disease in accordance with religious or other spiritual tenets and 
practices.”239 Similar language about sensitivity to one’s religious  
234. Id. 
235. See Jeffrey Addicott, Bioterrorism: Examining American Legal and 
Policy Readiness, NATO SCIENCE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY SERIES: 
MEDICAL RESPONSE TO TERROR THREATS 14 (A. Richman et al., eds., 
2010) (noting that “[t]he case law regarding the quarantine of 
individuals is sparse because the United States has yet to face mass 
quarantine due to the spread of an epidemic, pandemic or bioterrorist 
attack.”). 
236. NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, STATE QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION 
STATUTES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-quarantine-and-
isolation-statutes.aspx (last visited August 26, 2014). 
237. Communicable Disease Confinement Procedure, N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-
07.6-02(h) (West 2013). 
238. Conditions of and Principles for Isolation or Quarantine, OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 433.128 (9) (West 2014). 
239. Id. § 433.128 (10)(a). Additionally, sub section (b) of the statute 
provides that “[n]othing in Or. Rev. Stat. 
433.126 to 433.138, 433.142 and 433.466 prohibits a person who relies 
exclusively on spiritual means to treat a communicable disease or 
possibly communicable disease and who is infected with a communicable 
disease or has been exposed to a toxic substance from being isolated or 
quarantined in a private place of the person’s own choice, provided the 
private place is approved by the Public Health Director or the local 
health administrator and the person who is isolated or quarantined 
complies with all laws, rules and regulations governing control, 
sanitation, isolation and quarantine.” Id. § 433.128 (10)(b).  
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beliefs in times of isolation and quarantine applies to Connecticut,240 
Massachusetts,241 Hawaii,242 South Carolina,243 and Washington 
State,244 to mention but a few. California provides a religious 
exemption for examination or inspection of any person who depends 
exclusively on prayer for healing in accordance with the teachings of 
any recognized religious sect. The exemption does not cover 
compulsory reporting of communicable diseases and isolation and 
quarantine where there is probable cause to suspect that the person is 
infected with the disease in a communicable stage.245 Rhode Island 
offers quarantine and isolation as an alternative to those who may be 
opposed to or unwilling, for reasons of health, religion, and conscience, 
to undergo immunization or treatment.246 On the other hand, states 
like Colorado,247 New Jersey,248 and North Carolina,249 provide no 
religious exemptions for quarantine and isolation. 
 
240. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-131(b)(9) (2014) (providing that “to the extent 
possible, cultural and religious beliefs shall be considered in addressing 
the needs of individuals and establishing and maintaining premises used 
for quarantine and isolation.”). 
241. 105 MASS. CODE. REGS. 300.210 (H)(1)(c) (2014) (noting that “[t]o the 
extent possible, cultural and religious beliefs and existing disabilities 
shall be considered in addressing the needs of individuals.”). 
242. HAW. REV. STATS. § 325-8 (West 2014). 
243. Emergency Health Powers, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-530(B)(8) (2013) 
(stating that “to the extent possible, cultural and religious beliefs must 
be considered in addressing the needs of the individuals and establishing 
and maintaining isolation and quarantine premises.”). 
244. Conditions and Principles for Isolation or Quarantine, WASH. ADMIN. 
CODE § 246-100-045 (9) (noting that “isolation or quarantine shall not 
abridge the right of any person to rely exclusively on spiritual means 
alone through prayer to treat a communicable or possibly communicable 
disease in accordance with religious tenets and practices, nor shall 
anything in this chapter be deemed to prohibit a person so relying who 
is infected with a contagious or communicable disease from being 
isolated or quarantined in a private place of his or her own choice, 
provided, it is approved by the local health officer, and all laws, rules 
and regulations governing control, sanitation, isolation and quarantine 
are complied with. At his or her sole discretion, the local health officer 
may isolate infected individuals declining treatment for the duration of 
their communicable infection.”). 
245. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121370 (West 2014). 
246. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-8-4 (West 2014). 
247. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-506 (3) (2014) (providing that “[a]ny person 
who depends exclusively on prayer for healing in accordance with the 
teachings of any well-recognized religious sect, denomination, or 
organization, and claims exemptions on such grounds, shall nevertheless 
be subject to examination, and the provisions of this part 5 regarding 
compulsory reporting of communicable diseases and isolations shall 
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What these divergent state practices demonstrate is that the laws 
and regulations regarding religious exemptions in quarantine and 
isolation depend on whether a public health emergency has been 
declared. Whereas this is not necessarily a bad thing, these 
exemptions, I argue, do not bode well for public health. 
A significant problem with religious exemptions in quarantine and 
isolation is that they seem antithetical to science. For example, both 
the laws of Oregon and Washington provide that isolation or 
quarantine shall not abridge the right of any person to rely 
exclusively on spiritual means to treat a communicable disease “from 
being isolated or quarantined in a private place of the person’s own 
choice, provided, it is approved by the local health officer, and all 
laws, rules and regulations governing control, sanitation, isolation and 
quarantine are complied with.”250 It is hard to envision, from a public 
health or a biomedical standpoint how a quarantinable communicable 
disease can be treated “exclusively” by spiritual means. This is not an 
attack on anyone’s religion or sincere belief on treatment, rather, it is 
an acknowledgment that treatment of quarantinable communicable 
diseases requires much more than spiritual means. For example, 
according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, isolation 
and quarantine are authorized for cholera, diphtheria, infectious 
tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers, 
 
apply where there is probable cause to suspect that such person has 
active tuberculosis. Such person shall not be required to submit to any 
medical treatment or to go to or be confined in a hospital or other 
medical institution if the person can safely be isolated in the person’s 
own home or other suitable place of the person’s choice.”). 
248. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4A-12 (2014) (providing in pertinent part that 
“[a]ny person who indicates that he subscribes to the art of healing by 
prayer as practiced by any well recognized religious denomination, the 
principles of which are opposed to medical treatment, shall not be 
required to submit to medical treatment unless he, or his parent, 
guardian or person standing in loco parentis, consents . . . . Any such 
person, however, shall be subject to all rules and regulations with 
reference to quarantine and isolation in case of contagious or infectious 
diseases and subject to physical restraint in case of emergency or 
violence.”). 
249. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A-19.12 (3)(e) (2014) (providing in pertinent 
part that the Division of Emergency Management shall have the powers 
and duties as delegated by the Governor and Secretary of Public Safety 
to coordinate with the State Health Director to amend or revise the 
North Carolina Emergency Operations Plan regarding public health 
matters to provide for the appropriate conditions for quarantine and 
isolation in order to prevent further transmission of disease). 
250. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-100-045; OR. REV. STAT. § 433.128 (10)(b). 
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severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and flu that can cause a 
pandemic.251 Is it practical to treat any of these diseases spiritually? 
I acknowledge that this is a difficult question to ask and 
potentially a very divisive one. With reference to science and faith 
healing, one commentator captures the familiar arguments used to 
support religious accommodations in health, noting:  
According to the substantive view, the privileging of science 
over faith constitutes unacceptable 
discrimination against religion. In order, therefore, to achieve 
substantive equality for religion, faith has to be put 
on a presumptively equal footing with the methods and insight 
of science. One committed to substantive equality for religion 
would ask whether, for some families, prayer and/or other 
spiritual healing techniques function equivalently to 
conventional medicine in the family life of others. If those who 
use doctors rather than prayer in the effort to heal their ailing 
children are presumptively not neglectful, or culpable if the 
children are not cured, should not those who use prayer instead 
of conventional medicine be equally immune to charges of 
neglect or assertions of culpability?252 
A detailed comparison of efficacy of biomedicine and faith healing 
is beyond the scope of this paper.253 Suffice it to say that religion has, 
and does continue to play both a positive and negative role in 
population health. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that there is no 
contemporary evidence tending to show that any of the quarantinable 
diseases have been successfully treated spiritually. 254 
 
251. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, LEGAL AUTHORITIES FOR 
ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolatio
n.html. 
252. Ira. C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case 
Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA L. REV. 
555, 584 (1991). 
253. See generally Kaja Finkler, Sacred Healing and Biomedicine, 8 MED. 
ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 178 (1994) (addressing similarities and differences 
between sacred healing and biomedicine); Sipco J. Vellenga, Longing for 
Health: A Practice of Religious Healing and Biomedicine Compared, 47 
J. RELIGIOUS HEALTH, 326, 326-37 (2008) (arguing that biomedicine and 
faith healing have at least five principles in common); and Levin, supra 
note 3, at 3 (noting that “there is considerable evidence that one’s 
religious life has something significant to say about one’s mental 
health.”). 
254. To be fair, this writer is cognizant of some passages in religious texts 
attesting to religious healing of those afflicted with plague, leprosy, and 
perhaps tuberculosis. In the Old Testament for example, Aaron stopped 
a plague that had killed 14,700 people, Numbers 16:46-50 (King James); 
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V. BALANCING PUBLIC SAFETY AND PERSONAL CHOICE 
OR RELIGION GONE TOO FAR? 
Whenever questions arise about balancing individual liberties like 
freedom of religion, against public health, welfare, and safety laws and 
regulations, each side digs in and proclaims its view to be the right 
one. One group ostensibly argues for complete accommodation to 
religious liberty;255 others (including this writer) argue for great 
deference to public health authorities;256 and yet others try to find a 
middle ground.257 My view is that, in times of an epidemic or a 
 
The Qu’ran mentions Jesus healing lepers and the blind, Surah 3. Al 
‘lmran 49. That having been said, this writer is unaware of 
contemporary evidence of treatment. 
255. See, e.g., Michael McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 115, 140 (1992) (“[T]he freedom of citizens to exercise their 
faith should not depend on the vagaries of democratic politics, even if 
expressed through laws of general applicability.”); and Smith, supra 
note 18, at 266 (“[W]hether the nation’s long standing commitment to 
special protection for religious freedom should now be discarded presents 
a major historic decision that is likely to become even more 
conspicuously contested in coming years.”). 
256. This writer’s view is in accord with several cases and legal 
commentators, e.g. Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218, 222 (Miss. 1979) 
(noting that many courts at various levels have determined that there is 
no constitutional right to a religious or philosophical exemption when it 
comes to public health issues); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
166 (1944) (“[T]he right to practice religion freely does not include 
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or 
the latter to ill health or death.”); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1987) (“However much we might 
wish that it were otherwise, government simply could not operate if it 
were required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and desires.”); 
Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591 (1990) (suggesting that 
accommodations are troublesome for reasons that transcend the likely 
violence they will inflict upon equality of religious liberty. If political 
entities may make religion-specific policies even when not so required by 
the Constitution, a number of unappealing consequences may follow); 
and Alan Garfield, The Contraception Mandate Debate: Achieving a 
Balance, 114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 24 (2014) (“But 
the mandate controversy is more Taliban than Torquemada. It has more 
to do with religious employers foisting their religion on female employees 
than with government foisting its secular values on religious 
employers.”). 
257. See, e.g., Lawrence Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health 
Powers Act: Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally 
Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 JAMA 622, 626 (2002) (writing that 
“[p]ublic health officials are explicitly directed to respect individual 
religious objections to vaccinations and treatment. Officials must follow 
specified legal standards before using isolation or quarantine, which are 
 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
The Public Health Implications of Religious Exemptions: A Balance 
Between Public Safety and Personal Choice, or Religion Gone Too Far? 
301 
pandemic, public health cannot afford the luxury of debating which 
viewpoint, between public safety and personal choice, should prevail. 
Critics may argue, with some force, that the case for individual 
liberty in public health is compelling because the U.S. Supreme Court 
has long held that a competent person has a constitutional right to 
refuse medical treatment.258 Point well taken. I submit, however, that 
isolation and quarantine are tools to prevent ill persons from 
spreading the disease to the population. It is no longer about an 
individual’s choice for treatment. It is about protecting the “herd” 
from a dangerous disease. As the U.S. Supreme Court so aptly put it 
in Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, “the right to practice 
religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the 
child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”259 
Yes, we can have the debate about what process is due to those who 
are quarantined or isolated. That is entirely appropriate. But 
automatically granting religious exemptions in quarantine and 
isolation cases as some of the states have done does a disservice to 
public health. 
Furthermore, granting religious exemptions in quarantine and 
isolation cases arguably runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Courts have so far not been presented with such a challenge, except 
in Moore v. Draper.260 In Moore, the petitioner was confined in the 
Southwest Florida State Sanitarium at Tampa under the provisions of 
a Florida statute relating to compulsory isolation and hospitalization 
of tubercular persons. 261 The court mentioned that the “[p]etitioner 
makes a special attack upon the law on the ground that it 
discriminates against all persons other than those of a certain religious 
faith and belief.”262 The court found that “Section 392.23, Subsection 
(2), F.S.A. is sufficient protection and guarantee that [petitioner’s] 
religious freedom is not being denied to him. Religious freedom cannot 
be used as a cloak for any person with a contagious or infectious 
disease to spread such disease because of his religion.”263 Although this 
decision neither discusses the statute in question nor the 
 
authorized only to prevent the transmission of contagious diseases to 
others and must be by the least restrictive means available.”). 
258. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990).  
259. 321 U.S. at 166. 
260. 57 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1952). 
261. F.S.A. § 392.23(2), repealed by Laws 1951, c. 26828, § 14. 
262. 57 So. 2d at 650. 
263. Id. 
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discrimination issue raised by the petitioner, it raises the possibility 
that such a challenge is possible.264 
Finally, others may contend that denying religious exemptions to 
quarantined and isolated individuals may violate federal laws, 
particularly RFRA in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. The answer is hard to predict. However, 
quarantine and isolation measures can conform to RFRA, even 
though the measures may substantially burden an individual’s 
religious conscience. All that RFRA requires is that if the 
government’s action substantially burdens a person’s religion, then 
the government must “[demonstrate] that application of the burden to 
the person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.”265 
In light of the foregoing discussion, I am persuaded that 
overwhelming number of states providing statutory religious 
exemptions for immunizations, and those that provide religious 
exemptions for contraception, quarantine and isolation, are tipping 
the balance heavily in favor of religion. To be fair, public health 
concerns do not necessarily trump religious rights in the view of some. 
Thus, they would rather see public health suffer than impinge on any 
one’s religious rights. This approach is however, proving to be 
detrimental to public health, which in turn then ends up hurting the 
same individuals whose religious rights the states are trying to 
accommodate. Therein lies the conundrum. 
VI.  Suggested Approaches 
Providing recommendations for or against religious exemptions in 
public health is an exceedingly difficult task. In the words of one 
commentator, “[t]he United States has a romantic attitude towards 
religious individuals and institutions, as though they are always 
right.”266 Therefore, any argument for or against religious 
accommodations in health engenders charged and often passionate 
defenses.267 Nevertheless many commentators have made 
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woman’s right to complete and accurate information about her condition 
and treatment choices violates medical ethics and existing law.”) with 
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recommendations ranging from a complete abolition of state religious 
exemptions,268 to reaching for a more optimal balance between 
religious freedom and public health,269 to complete accommodation of 
religious exemptions by the states.270 It seems to me that these 
recommendations have either been ignored or have been palpably 
unpersuasive to many state legislatures. So where do we go from here? 
Notwithstanding some of the recommendations already offered, there 
are two approaches that have not been discussed extensively in the 
literature and yet are germane to public health. The first is that state 
lawmakers should be encouraged to apply evidence-based law,271 just 
like public health practitioners and physicians apply the principles of 
evidence-based medicine in their work. “Evidence-based medicine 
(EBM) [is] defined as the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of 
current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual 
patients.”272 Likewise, evidence-based law relies on the best available 
scientific evidence and data by lawmakers as a basis for lawmaking. 
Unfortunately, state legislators are inclined to rely on anecdotal 
evidence and common wisdom unsupported by scientific research.273 
For example, despite studies showing the disadvantages of religious 
exemptions in public health, forty-eight states statutorily provide for 
religious exemptions for school vaccination laws,274 while twenty-one 
states offer exemptions from contraceptive coverage, usually for 
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religious reasons, for insurers or employers in their policies.275 A few 
state statutes contain language that appears to grant religious 
exemptions for quarantine and isolation detainees.276 This underscores 
the point that scientific evidence, or empiricism, is lacking in the law. 
As Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski has noted, legal empiricism has 
remained in the scholarly academies and has not assumed a similar 
presence in the field of legal practice or rulemaking (e.g., legislatures 
and courts).277 This has been and will continue to be harmful to public 
health. 
The second approach for public health is to find insider-
champions. Public health needs innovative leaders who are willing to 
challenge the status quo. Three such persons merit mentioning here. 
First is the former mayor of New York City, Michael Bloomberg. 
Professor Lawrence Gostin has written that the public health 
community views Bloomberg “as an urban innovator—a rare political 
and business leader willing to fight for a built environment conducive 
to healthier, safer lifestyles.”278 Bloomberg “has used the engine of 
government to make New York City a laboratory for innovation—
raising the visibility of public health, testing policy effectiveness, and 
probing the boundaries of state power.”279 Even though some of his 
policies were struck down by the courts,280 Bloomberg has proved to 
be an insider-champion for public health in ways that have changed 
public health forever. 
The second insider-champion is former surgeon general C. Everett 
Koop. According to the Washington Post, “Koop is justly renowned 
for his role in the tobacco wars of the 1990s. His repeated warnings 
that tobacco use was deadly and increasing among children anchored 
a series of famous congressional hearings that led to warning labels, 
bans on Joe Camel-type advertising and finally, in 2009, the FDA’s 
regulation of tobacco.”281 Additionally, Koop’s role in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS is legendary. The Washington Post notes:  
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Koop was a noted social conservative who disapproved of 
homosexuality. But as a doctor, he recognized the 
epidemiological implications of what was happening and fought 
tirelessly to contain them. Whenever he testified before 
Congress, he knocked down the conservative talking point that 
“AIDS is not a no-fault disease.” He labored to disabuse 
Republicans . . . of their crackpot conviction that AIDS spread 
through spores and could be transmitted by spoons and scissors. 
He intentionally highlighted the tragedies of pediatric AIDS and 
hemophiliacs like Ryan White who contracted the disease 
through transfusions to shape public consciousness of AIDS as 
affecting more than gay men and intravenous drug users. 
Ultimately, this strategy yielded landmark legislation, the Ryan 
White CARE Act. 282 
Thus, Koop’s efforts helped shift public awareness in a way that 
made legislation possible. 283 
Finally, a third insider-champion is Bill Gates acting through the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The Foundation is “an enormous 
funder of biomedical research that has quickly rearranged 
the public health universe.”284 The Foundation applies science and 
technology to address the most severe health problems in the 
developing world,285 including HIV/AIDs, malaria, and tuberculosis. It 
has also funded vaccine delivery programs thereby saving millions of 
lives a year.286 But more important to this discussion is the 
Foundation’s support of evidence-based decision-making. The 
Foundation invests in providing reliable information and analysis to 
help health officials review new vaccines and thereby speed up their 
decision-making. 287 
I acknowledge here that others may quibble with the second 
approach as a departure from the central thesis of the paper regarding 
religious exemptions. To some extent, I am willing to concede that 
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point. However, the suggested approach centers on individuals who 
have focused on protection of entire populations, rather than personal 
autonomy or individual rights. I mention these three champions 
because they have shown a penchant for relying on scientific evidence 
to formulate public health policy and programs. In so doing, they 
have gone against dogma and become innovators. These are the 
insider-champions who can confront state laws on religious 
exemptions and legislators and make a difference on what is written 
into public health laws and how the laws are implemented. 
Conclusion 
This paper started by asking three questions: First, do religious 
exemptions in public health activities allow the government to unduly 
prefer religion over non-religion? Second, is immunizing religious 
conduct from scrutiny consistent with public welfare, health, and 
safety? Third, is the overwhelming number of states (forty-eight) 
providing statutory religious exemptions for immunizations and nearly 
half that provide exemptions for contraception, tipping the balance 
heavily in favor of religion?  
The answer to the first question is a qualified yes. For example, in 
McCarthy v. Boozman,288 a parent challenged the Arkansas statute 
requiring the vaccination of all school children. The statute provided 
a religious exemption to members of a recognized church or religious 
denomination.289 In finding the religious exemption unconstitutional, 
the court noted that “the preferential restriction contained in 
Arkansas’ religious exemption provision contravenes the 
Establishment Clause’s principles of governmental neutrality,”290 that 
the exemption failed to satisfy the commands of the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment, and also violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.291 But this question 
is qualified by the fact that the exemptions have been held to be valid 
in general. Legislatures can choose to grant exemptions, but the 
constitution does not require them.292 So, although legislatures may 
grant exemptions, they must not favor some religion unfairly over 
others.293 
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As for the second question, regarding whether immunizing 
religious conduct is consistent with public welfare, health, and safety, 
the answer seems to be no. The studies cited in Part II (A)(2) herein 
show that religious exemptions place public health at a risk. Finally, 
regarding the third question, I am persuaded that the overwhelming 
number of states providing statutory religious exemptions for 
immunizations and the nearly half that provide exemptions for 
contraception are responsible for tipping the balance heavily in favor 
of religion. 
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